Doe v. Bolton by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1972
Doe v. Bolton
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Doe v. Bolton. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 5. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University
School of Law, Virginia.
Court ................... . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Powell, J ... ................. . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J ................... . 




Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 






N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS 
REV AFF 
MOTION AB- NOT 
VOT-
G D SENT lNG 
No. 70-40 
71 .. 90 ~ 
D o u GLAS, J. ' MARSHALL, J. 
BRENNAN, J. ~ 
- .~·9~ 
STEWART, J. PowELL, J . 
REHNQUIST, J. 
/ 
:: No. 70-40 DOE v. BOLTON - -· -- Argued 10711/72 
t-t . ~ ~1- ~~t~~ 
~
~S'H..L-'s· ~~ ~ ~''f-u~~"' 
-~ vr ~~~ ~~ W P--H~ 
~~ trt ~l ~~,-V 
~~~<A-~~-
s~ ~---&__~~ 
d- ~~~ L-vvv~l'', ·?AJ~~ 
~v 




v~ / -~~~~~ fi-B!J ~ 
'--/ ../ / ~~ ~-~~ 
l-. ~ ---- . --
, 
~ ;5.a~ 
TL.... ~ CJ-. 11 $'~ cu__~ ~J- ~ 
3 ry e:r. ~ "Vl-1cd-u-f m 
~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~c__ 
~ "'-0 r~~-~1 
~~-~~~ 




----;? ~~ -~~~ ,, 
' ~ ~;..._c__ ~ ~'-' 
l-M.....~~~t~~ 
0--~~~~. 
~ ~1--u-,__. L-t.--- ~ It~ ~ ~\ 
~~ a__~ 
~ rtu_ ~· ~ az-l ~- ' 
~~~~~· 
/1-1-rJ&JJL ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
---\ ~lAA. '1 ~ -~~ 
/ ~i-t- ~ ·~~~ 
·~~ ~ v-f.u_ ~~ 
~~ . 
k~ ~~ qu~ '4·(;..:! 
~~~~ -
, ... ,.,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§upuutt Qflltt.tf o-f tqt ~ttitt~ .ihtttG 
._.attlrhts-hm, ~. Of. 2Llb1't..;J 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 25, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Here, for your consideration, is a memorandum 
on the second abortion case. What this would accomplish 
is the striking of the Georgia statutory requirements as 
to (1) residence, (2) confirmation by two physicians, (3) 
advance approval by the hospital abortion committee, and 
(4) performance of the procedure only in a JCAH accred-
ited hospital. Thus, at this point (pending determination 
of the appeal in the Fifth Circuit) the District Court has 
stricken certain provisions of the Georgia statute and we 
would strike additional ones. 
What essentially remains is that an abortion may 
be performed only if the attending physician deems it neces-
sary "based upon his best clinical judgment, 11 if his judgment 
is reduced to writing, and if the abortion is performed in a 
hospital licensed by the State through its Board of Health. 
This, I should point out, does not mean that it may be per-
formed in a facility that is not a hospital. Some of you may 
wish to take that step, too. 
I might say that this was not the easiest conclusion 
for me to reach. I have worked closely with .§ltnery ism;y 
hospital committees set up by the medical profession itself, 
a nd I have seen them operate over extensive periods. I can 
state with complete conviction that they serve a high purpose 
in maintaining standards and in keeping the overzealous sur-
geon's knife sheathed. There is a lot of unnecessary surgery 
. , 
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done in this country, and intraprofessional restraints of 
this kind have accomplished much that is unnoticed and 
certainly is unappreciated by people generally. 
I have also seen abortion mills in operation and 
the general misery they have caused de spite their being 
run by otherwise "competent" technicians. 
I should observe that, according to information 
contained in some of the briefs, knocking out the Texas 
statute in Roe v. Wade will invalidate the abortion laws ll in a majority of our States. Most States focus only on 
the preservation of the life of the mother. Vuitch, of 
course, is on the books, and I had assumed that the Con-
ference, at this point, has no intention to overrule it. It 
is because of Vuitch' s vagueness emphasis and a hope, 
perhaps forlorn, that we might have a unanimous court 
in the Texas case, that I took the vagueness route. 
Sincerely, 
~~- !1 . 
T~: The Chief Just ice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. J1.:stice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr · Jt:stice Mar· shall / 
Mr. Justice Powell V 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
1st DRAFT From: Blac1cmun, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.Bculated: S/Jsi7 :J.. 
No. 70-40 Recirculated: 
Mary Doe et al. , Appellants, 
v. 
Arthur K. Bolton , as Attor-
ney General of the State 
of Georgia, et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia. 
[May -, 1972] 
Memorandum of MR. Jus'riCE BLACKMUN. 
In this appeal the Georgia criminal abortion stat-
utes are under constitutional attack. The statutes, 
~§ 26- 1201 to 26- 1203 of the State's Criminal Code, 
formulated by Georgia Laws 1968, 1249, 1277, are set 
forth in the Appendix.' They have not been tested J \ 
constitutionally in the Georgia courts. 
Section 26- 1201 defines criminal abortion. Section 
26- 1202, however, removes from that definition abor-
tions "performed by a physician duly licensed" in 
Georgia when, "based upon his best clinical judgment .... 
an abortion is necessary because" 
" ( 1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endan-11 
ger the life of the ! rer ant woman or would ~riously 
and penuaneptQ: ijur_ her health /? or 
"(2) The fetus would very likelY be born with a 
grave, permanent, and irrc"'"mediable mental or physical 
aefect" or 
_, 
"(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or statu-
tory rape." 
- L 
1 The italicized portions of the statutes in the Appendix a rc those· 
held unconstitutional by the District Court. 
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Section 26-1202 then specifies a number of prerequi-
sites for the abortion if it is to qualify under the 
except10n. These are (1) and (2) residence of the 
woman in Georgia, (3) reduction to writing of the per-
forming physician's medical judgment and written con-
currence in that judgment by at least two other Georgia 
licensed physicians, ( 4) performance of the abortion 
m a hcensed and "accredited" hospital. ( 5) approval 
in advance 6y a hos\ital abortion committee, (6) cer--t1 cat10n m a rape situation, and (7), (8), and (9} 
mamtenance and confidenh ahty of records. There is 
a provision for judicial determination of the legal-
ity of a proposed abortion on petition of the ~ir~~ 
law officet· or of a close relative, as therein clefincdO 
the " ·oman, and for expeditious hearing of that petition. 
There .is also a provi;'ion giving a hospital the right not 
to admit an abortion patient, and giving any physi-
cian and any hospital employee or staff membrr the 
"ri'ght not to participate in the procedure because of 
~1 or religious grounds. 
? 
Section 26-1203 provides that a person convicted of ;-/ () 
criminal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment 
for not less han one nor more than 10 years. 
As appellants ackno,,·lcc ge/ t 1c _ eorg1a s~te ~ ( ). \ 
is patterned after the American La''" Institute's Model r' 
Penal Code ~ 23ir.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1062). 
Other States have legislation based upon the Model 
Penal Code. Sec Ark. Rtats. §§ 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp. 
1971); ~Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-55.5 (West 
Supp. 1972); Co]Q
1 
Rev. Stats. 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 
(Perm. Cum. Supp. 1967); Del. Code §§ 1790- 1793 
(Supp. 1970); Kap . Stat. § 21-3407 (Supp. 1971); ~ 
Code, Art. 43, §§ 137- 139 (Repl. 1971); ~ Mea Stat. 
§§ 40A-5-1 to 40A- 5-3 (Supp. 1971); N. C. Gen. Stat. 
- LQ 
~Brief, at 25, n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
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~ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971 ) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 435.405 to 
435.403; S. C. Code ~~ 16- 87 to 16- 80 (Supp. 1971); 
Va. Code ~~ 18.1- 62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1071). Mr. 
:ru;tce Clark has described some of these States as hav-
ing ''led the way.'" Rel}glon, Morality, ana Abortwn: 
A- Constitutwrial Appraisal , 2 Loyola U. (L. A. ) L. Rev. 
1' 11 ( 1969). 
I 
On April 16, 1970, Mary Doe,'~ 23 other individuals 
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as 
nurses registered in G eorgia, five as Georgia clgrgymeu. 
a;:;'d two as Georgia social workers), and two nonprofit 
Georgia corporations, instituted tl1is action in the North-
ern District of Georgia against the State's Attorney Gen-
eml, the District Attorney of Fulton County, and the 
Chief of Police of the city of Atlanta. The plaintiffs 
sought a declaratory judgment that the Georgia abor~n 
statutes were unconstitutional in their entirety. They 
also sought injunctive relief restraining the defendants 
and their successors from enforcing the challenged 
statutes. 
Mary Doe alle~d: 
( 1) She was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, married, 
and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living children. 
The two older ones had been placed in a foster home 
because of Doe's poverty and inability to care for them. 
The youngest, born July 19, 1969, was with adoptive 
parents. Doe's husband had recently abandoned her 
and she \Vas forced to live with her indigent parents 
and their eight children. She and her husband, however, 
had become reconciled. He was a construction worker 
and only sporadically employed. She had been a mental 
patient at the State Hospital. She had been ad vised 
m at a7l abortion could be Jerformed her with less 
3 The n:une is a pseudonym. Complaint, Appendix 7. 
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she was carrying. She would be unable to support or 
care for the new cli'ilrl. 
(2) On March 25, 1970, Doe made ~.pplication to 
the Abortion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital, 
Atlanta, to be considered for a therapeutic abortion 
under § 26-1202 of the Georgia Code. Her applica-
tion was denied 16 days later, on April 10, when she 
"·as eight weeks pregnant, on the ground that her situa-
tion was not one within the reach of i: 26-1202 a .4 
(3) Because of this c emal of her application, oe 
'"as fac7d with the alternatives of either relinquis~ 
"her right to decide when and how many children she 
II 
win bea~" or seeking an abortion illegal under the 
Georgia statutes. This was a violation of rights guar-
anteed her by the Firstd Fourth, Fifth, Kl£1!1, and Four-
teenth Amendments. She sued "on her own behalf 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated." 
The other plaintiffs claimed the Georgia statutes 
"chilled ancrae£erred',.--tfiem froi racticin their re-
spective professions an , thus, eprived them of t e1r 
constitutional nghts. Those plaintiffs also purported 
to sue on their own ochaiT And on behalf of otrp-s 
similarly situated. 
A three-judge District Court was convened. An offer 
of proof as to Doe's identity was made but the court felt 
it unnecessary to receive that proof. The case was 
~d on thulcading§ and interrogatories. 
By its per curiam opinion the District Court held that 
all the laintiffs had standing, but that only Doc pre-
sente con roversy. On the merits. the 
those portions of §~ 
1 Mary Doc, by her an~wrrs to interrogatories, stated that her 
application for an abortion \Yas approved at Georgia Baptist Hos-
pital on May 5, 1970, but that she was not approved as a charity 
patient there and had no money to pay for an abortion. Appendix 
64. 
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1202 (a) and (b) (3) that would limit legal abortions 
to the three situations specified; § 26-1202 (b)(6) re-
latmg to cerbHcabon m a rape situation; and 
§ 26- 1202 (c) authorizing the court proceeding upon 
the petition of the circuit law officer or a designated 
relative of the woman. Declaratory reliefl accordin~yr 
was granted. The court, however, uphe d the ot er I 
parts of the statute and denied altogether the request 
for an injunction. 319 F. Supp. ID48 (ND Ga. 1970). 
Claiming that they are entitled to broader relief, the 
plaintiffs have taken a direct appeal pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 1253. The decision on jurisdiction was post-
poned to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941 
(1971). 
The defendants filed a direct cross appeal but this 
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 936· 
(1971). We are advised by the appellees, Brief, at 42, 
that an alternative appeal on their part is pending in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
The extent, therefore, to which the decision below is ad-
verse to the appellees, that is, the extent to which 
portions of the Georgia statute were held to be uncon-
stitutional, technically is not now before us. 5 Swarb 
v. Lennox, 405 U. S. 191, 201 (1972). 
II 
Our decision today in Roe v. Wade, ante, at -,. 
'establishes (1) that the case is properly here on direct 
appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, for the three-judge Dis-
trict Court specifically denied the injunctive relief the 
plaintiff-appellants requested; (2) that, despite her 
pseudonym, we may accept as true Mary Doe's existence 
and her pregnant state on April 16, 1970; (3) that the 
5 What we decide today, however, may well have implications for · 
the issues raisrtl by the appellees' appeal pending in the Fifth 
Circuit. 
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constitutional issue is substantial; ( 4) that the termina-
tion of Doe's and all other Georgia pregnancies existing 
in 1070 has not rendered the case moot; and (5) ~ 
Doe and her class, that .is, pregnant Georgia women, 
d~g to maintain the actl~l?_9~ _Qo_J2--;..0-
sent a justiciable controversy:-
~=J usticiaole controversy status of the 
other plaintiff-appellants-physicians, nurses, clergy-
men , social workers, and corporations-is Irs>: certain 
but, inasmuch as Doe and her class are recognized, 1s 
perha )S a matter of no Teat Sl ·nifica11ce. We con-
e uclc, ho1Yever. that the ph sician-a) )e ants. who arc 
Georgia-licensed doctors consultcc y women about 
pregnancies, also wescnt a ·usticiable ont d -
s~ite the fact t 1at the record does not disclose that any 
one of them has been )rosecutc , or threatened, ~ 
v10 ation of the State's ahortjgp stp t pte§t The physi-
cta"n is the pen;on against whom these criminal statutes 
directly operate in the event he procures an abortion 
that does not qualify under the statutes' exception and 
with respect to ''"hich all the statutorily prescribed con-
ditions are not met. 
In holding that the physicians, while theoretically 
havin5 standing, did not wesent a usticiablc contro-
~crsy, the District :ourt seems to have relied primarily 
on Poe v. -ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). There a 
sharply divided court dismissed an appeal from a state 
court on the ground that it presented no real contro-
versy justifying the adjudication of a constitutional 
issue. But the challenged Connecticut statute , deemed 
to prohibit the giving of medical advice on the usc of 
contraceptives, had been enacted in 1879 and , with 
only one apparent exception, no one had ever been 
1~osecuted under it. Georgia's statute. in contrast, is 
recent and not moribund , Furthermore, .it is the suc-
cessor to other Georgia abortion statutes under which,. 
70-40-0PIN £ON 
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we arc told/ physicians have been prosecuted. The 
present case, in our view, is clo~cr to Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), where the Court recognized 
the right of a schoolteacher. though not charged crim-
inally, to challenge her State's anti-evolution statute. 
See also Gris·wold Y. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 481 
( 1965). 
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker, 
and corporate appellants are another step remoyccl. As 
to them, the Georgia statutes operate less directly. Not 
being licensed physicians. the nurses and the others arC' 
in no )Osition to render mec 1ca advice. They "·ould 
l5c reached by the abortion statutes only in their ca-
pacity as accessories or counsellor-conspirators. We 
conclude that we need not pass upon the status of 
these additional appellants in this suit for the issues 
are sufficiently and adequately presented by Mary Doc 
and by the physician-appcllan ts, and nothing is gained 
or lost by the presence or absence of the nurses, the 
clergymen, the social workers, and the corporations. See 
Roe v. TV ade, ante, at-. 
III 
The appellants attack the Georgia abortion statu tcs 
on several grounds: (A) invalid restriction of an ab-
solute fundamental right to personal and marital pri-
vaQ.Y; (B) v .... _ a..:.g._·u....,c_ncss; (C) deprivation of procedural 
and substantive due process; (D) improper limitation 
to Georgia residents; and (E) denial of equal protection. 
We consider these claims in turn. 
A. Tl~1rt, in varying contexts, has recognized a 
right of personal privacy and has rooted it in the Four-
teenth Amendment, or in the Bill of Ri gh ts, or in 
the latter's penumbras. See E1'senstadt v. Baird, 
U. S. -, - ( 1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
G Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. 
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U. S., at 484; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 5G4 
(1969); Loving Y. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541- 542 ( Hl42); 
Pierce v. Society of Sislers, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer 
'"· Nebraska, 262 U. 8. 390 (1923). 
The appellants assert that the scope of this right of 
perso11af privacy includes, for a woman, the right to 
clec~ninate an existing but Uiltvantca 
pregnancy w1tliout any state interfereuce or control 
\Yl;atsoe~ They argue that if, by Griswold, one 
is protected in deciding to limit the size of her family 
by tho use of contraceptives, she deserves to have that 
right equally protected by having a choice to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy due to contraceptive failure. 
See Mr. Justice Clark's article, cited above, Religion, 
Morality and Abortion: A Constitutional Approach, 2 
Loyola U. (L. A.) L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1969). 
They further argue that the present Georgia statutes 
must be viewed historically, that is, from the fact that 
prior to the 1968 A~t an abortion in Georgia was not 
criminal if performed to "preserve the life" of the mother. 
See the 1933 Georgia Criminal Code, ~ 26-1102, which 
\vas the codification of Acts 1876, No. 130, ~ 2, p. 113. 
And when so vie\Yed, they contend, Geor ia herrtoforc 
I"ias g1ven httle, and certainly not first, consi era 1011 
to the unborn child. 
Pmaily, It is argued that the statute does not ade-
quately protect tho woman's right. This is so, it is 
said, because it would be physically and emotionally 
damaging to Doe to bring a child into her poor, "father-
less, 7 family, and 15'ecause aavances 111 medicine and in 
mecgcal techni9J_lesnave made 1t safer for a woman to 
have a medically induced abortion than to Eear a child. 
Tlrus a statute "whiCh requires a woman to carry an 
unwanted pregnancy to term infringes not only on a 
7 Appellants' Brief 25. 
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fundamental right of privacy but on the right to life 
itself." 
vVe a ree that a woman's interest in makin the fun-
damental persona ecisiOn whet 1er or not to bear an 
unwanted child is within the scope of personal rights 
protected by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
as articulated in the decisions cited above. Appellants' 
contentiOn, however, that the "·oman's right to make 
tho decision is absolute-that Georgia has either no 
valid interest in regulating it, or no interest strong· 
enough to support any limitation upon the "·oman's 
sole determination-is unpersuasive. 
. The appellants themselves recognize that a. century 
ago medical knowledge was not so advanced as it is 
today, the techniques of antisepsis were not known, 
and an abortion )rocedure was dangerous for the preg-
nant woman. To restnct t e ega 1ty o the abortiOn 
to the situation where it was deemed necessary, in 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the woman's 
life was only a natmal and expected line drawing in 
the exercise of the legislative judgment of that time. 
A State is not to be reproached for a past judgmental 
determination of this kind made in the light of then 
existing medical knowledge. It is Qlerefore illogical 
and unfair to argue, as the appellants do, that, be-
cause the earlier emphasis was on the preservation of 
the woman's life, the State's present professed mterest 
h1 the · tion of embryomc a1ill fetal "lifi' is some-
how to be downgraded. T at argument condemns the 
'State for past "•vrongs" and also denies it the rjgb~ 
'to readjust its views and emphases in the light of the 
more advanced knowledge and techniques of today. 
In any event, it is clear that Georgia's concern his-
torically has not been for the mother alone. The cases 
decided unc r the 1876 Act have 
various ways to the unborn. 
70-40-0PINION 
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specify ·when life begins. On this questwn there is no 
consehsus even amoli'g those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, or philosophy. or theology. 
In related contexts we have rejected the claim that 
an individual has an urilimited riO'ht to do as he )]cases 
\Yith 1is oc y.. ee, or example, Jacobson "· .llfassa-
chusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination), 
and Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (Hl27) (compulsory 
70-4Q-OPINION 
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sterilization). Except to note that the State's interest A ~ .b/ 
grows stronO'er as the woman a) xoaches term \\'e need / ~0 .J 
llOii e 111eate that interest with reater detail in order f,ufl r 
to recogmze t at it is a ' "compelling" state interest. As ~ yt,; ·7 
such, it ma constitutional] be asserted when the State ;JJ"-~ 
does so ,vith a) )ro )riate reO'ard for fun amcnta 1n 1-
1 
,bz 
1 Vl( ua.l rights. Cantwell Y. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, nu 307 (1940). T1e woman's )ersonal rio·ht, therefore, is 
~1ot unlimited. e a ancec agamst the Stat~ _jo 
Interest. r 
Consequently, we cannot automatically strike down 
tho remaining features of the Georgia statute simply 
because they restrict any right on the part of tho 
woman to have an abortion at will. The inguiry must 
br one that examines with particularity the impact 
of the statute upon the right, as it relates to the state 
m terest being assorted. We turn to t h1s mqmry m 
Part C, infra. First, ho"·evcr, we consider the appel-
lants' alternative theory that the statute as a whole must 
fall because it is unconstitutionally va ue. 
B. The ao·u argument centers m t 1e proposition 
that, "·ith t e 1strict Court's having stricken the statu-
torily stated reasons£ it stl r ma1ns a cr m or a "1-
cian to perform an abortion except when, as~ 26-1202 (a) 
ase - U)Oil his est c1111 1 ·u 0' 
an abortion is necessary." It is said that tho word 
" necessary" 1s so vague that it does not warn the physi-
cian of what conduct is proscribed; that the statute is 
"-holly without objective standards and is subject to 
diverse interpretations; and that doctors will choose 
to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary. 
One answer to this, of course, is that this state of 
affairs, if it is unfortunate, has been brought about 
by tho appellants' success in the District Court. Before 
portions of the statute ,\-ere stricken, it possessed the 
70-40-0PINI ON 
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objective standards specifically stated. Now that those 
standards have been removed, it is the appellants who 
complain that the statute has become vague. 
Be that as it may, the net result of the District Court's 
decision is that the abortion determination, so far as 
the physician is concerned, is made in the exercise of 
his professional, that is, his "best clinical judgment" 
in the light of all the attendant circumstances. He is 
not now restricted to the three situations specified. In-
stead, he may range farther afield wherever his medical 
judgment, properly and profess.iollally exercised, so dic-
tates and directs him. 
The vagueness argument is set at rest, we feel, by 
the decision only last Term in United States , .. Vuitch, 
402 U. S. 62, 71-73 (1971), when it was raised wfth 
respect to a District of Columbia statute outlawing abor-
tions "unless the same were done as necessary for the 
preservation of the mother's life or health and 
under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner 
of medicine .... " The Court interpreted the statute 
to bear upon psychological as well as physical well-
being, and, having done so, concluded that the term 
"health" presented no problem of vagueness. "Indeed, 
\Yhether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's 
physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians 
are obviously called upon to make routinely \Yhenever 
surgery is considered." 402 U. S., at 72. So here, 
'\vhether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abor-
tion is necessary," is a judgment that a Georgia physi-
cian will be called upon to make routinely. 
We agree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at 
1058, that the medical judgment may be exercised in 
the light of all factors-emotional, onom1c psycho-
TogiCal familial, physical-relevant to . e 1-being of 
tlie lfatient. Despue the appellants' s eming protesta-
tion to the contrary, all these facto s have a bearing 
J 
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upon health. This, of course, allows the attending 
physician the room he needs to make his medical judg-
ment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, 
not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman. 
C. Mary Doe's due process attack on the statute 
foc l..!.§._es on (1) the restnch on of abortions to accredited 
h'OsiJitS, (2) the pregnant woman's asserted inability 
to make a presentation to the hospital abortion com-
mittee, and (3) the alleged cumbersome and time-
consuming features of the confirming process. Appellant 
physicians argue that by subjecting their individual med-
ical judgments whether a patient should have an abor-
tion to additional consultation and committee approval 
unduly restricts their right to practice their profession, 
and thus deprives them of due process. 
Resolution of these issues, a.s has been noted, reguires 
an in uir into the acle uac t · tions 
or encroaching upon the fundamental persqpa.l privacy 
..;ight of Mary Doe recognized in Part A. supra. 
The first aspect concerns accreditation by the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. This 
Commission is a nonprofit corporation without govern-
mental sponsorship or overtones. No question is raised 
about the integrity of the organization or about the 
high purpose of the accreditation process.8 That proc-
8 Sinre its founding, JCAH has pnr~ued the "elusive goal" of 
defining the "optimal setting" for "quality of services in hospitals." 
JCAH, Accreditation Manual for Hospitab, Foreward (Dec. 1970). 
The Manual's Introduction states the organization's purpose to· 
establish standard~ :mel conduct accreditation programs that will 
afford quality medical care "to give patient~ the optimal benefits 
that medical science has to offer." Thi~ ambitious nnd admirable 
goal is illustrated by .JCAI-I'::; decil:lion in 1966 "to raise and strengthen 
the standards from their present level of minimum essential to the 
level of optimum achievable. . . ." Some of the;:;e "optimum 
achie\'able" standards required are: disclo~ure of hospital owner-
ship and control; a dietetic service and written dietetic policies; 
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the Commission is not 
opera 1011 at least one year. cere 1tatwn 1s a so e-
pcn clent upon the hospital's having, among other things, 
a radiology department, a mass casualt )1"00'rL m and 
nuclear medicine facilities. 'hose requirements do bear 
upon general l1osp1tal quahty and status, but they im-
press us as havin little bearinrr on a hospital's quali-
fication as a )]ace where an a ortwn-or any o 1er 
par wu ar me 1ca or sur ical )roccdurc-jnay be safcl:x; 
per ormed. The Model cnal Code ~ 2~0.3 does not, 
for example, include this requirement. And see Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Abortion 
Act (Second Tentative Draft. August 1970). contain-· 
ing no accredited hospital 1imitatiou.' 0 
n written di~n~trr plan for ma~~ rmcrgrneir~: :> mwlrar mrclim[ 
scn·ires progrmn; fnrilit ir .~ for hrmntology, chrmistry. microbiology, 
clinirnl mirro~ropy, :mel ~rro-immnnolog~· ; n profr~sion:d librar~· nnd 
clornment drlivrry ~c·n·irC'; a radiology progr:tm; n ~orin I scn·iceR 
plrtn ndmini~trrrcl by a (]u:; lifiC'd sorinl workrr; :mel a ~prrial rare 
unit. 
n "The .Joint Commi~sion nC'ithrr adnlC'atrs nor Oj)JlO~r~ an~r pnr-
tirul:tr po8ition wit b rr~prrt to rlrrt i\·r abortion,:." Lrtt rr dntrd 
July 9, 1971, from John I. Brrwrr, 1\'I. D. , Commi~~ioncr, .TCAH, 
to t hr Rorkrfrllrr Foundation. Brirf for amici, AmC'rirnn Collrgc 
or Ohstetri('inns :tile! G.\'II('('Oiugi.-<t", ct a! .. Jl. A-:l. 
10 Some stntulr~ do not hn\·r thr .JCAII nrrrrditrcl hospitnl re-
(]uirrmC'nt. Al:ts. Stnt. ~ ll.l5.0GO (1970); llnw. Sr~~. Law~, 1()70,. 
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We therefore hold that the JCALI accreditation re-
quirement does not withstand constitutional scrutiny 
in t he present cot1'tc:-...::t. It is a requirement that simply 
is not "based on differences that are reasonabl related 
to the purposes of t 1e Act in w uc It IS oun . Morey 
\'. Doud That is not to ---say, as the appellants themselves concede, Brief, at 4 
that Georgia may not or should not adopt stand::J:rds 
for 11Censmg a(] fil mTibes where abortio11s may be )er-
·formec so ong as t ose standards have a reasonable 
rcratiOnship to the ObJective the State i"eeks.:,to 
accomphsf1. 
'l'he second aspect of the attack, relating to the hos-
pital abortion committee and the pregnant woman's 
access to it, is based pnmarily on Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254 (1970), concerning the termination of 
"·elfare benefits , and Wisconsin v. Conslantmeau, 400* 
iJ. R. 433 ( 1!)71), concerning th g posting of an alcoholic's 
name. It is sugg~tecl that it is still a badge of infami' 
'TD1 many minds" to hear an illegitimate child, ancl that 
the Georgia system enables the committee members' 
personal vie\YS as to extramarital sex rcl 
1 
" and 
pums 1ment therefor, to govern their decisions. ._ 
'l'h1s approach obviously is one founded on suspicion 
and. o11e that discloses a lack of conficle11ce in the in-
tegrity of physiciap s. It appears also to lace undue 
emphasis on the abortion conum %¥ and on Its seem11J..i 
iso lation. The pregnant woman's principal counsel in 
the abortion decision is her personal physician. It is 
he ,,·ho makes the initial recommendation. Presum-
ably, and hopefully-if she has been candid with him-
Art. 1; N.Y. Penni Laws 125.05.3 (i\1d\innry 1971-1972 Supp.). 
wa~hin~ton';; ~tntutr ha~ the rrquircmrnt but rouplrs it with the 
altt'rnntil'<" of "a cdiral fnrilitv . b1· the state board 
of health." "\Vnsh. Rev. Cudr § 9.02.070 (1971 Supp .. -
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,he knO\VS all asm;cts of her case. He serves her essen-
tially as the family physician so esteemed in memory. 
Following accepted medical procedure, his recommenda-
tions would be conveyed with underlying reasons to the 
two other physicians who, pursuant to § 26-1202 (b) (3), 
must separately examine alld confirm. At that point 
the medical judgment is complete. To each and all 
of these physicians the woman has full access. 
We see nothing in the Georgia statute that denies 
access to the hospital abortion committee by or Qn 
behalf of "the pregnant woman. If the access point 
alone were Involved, we wo.;;'ld not be persuaded to strike 
down the committee provision on the unsupported as-
sumption that access is not provided. It is perhaps 
worth noting, also, that the abortion committee has 
a function of its own. It is a committee of the hospital 
and its members are members of the hospital's medical 
staff. The committee's composition usually is a chang-
ing one. In this way its work burden is more readily 
accepted ancl is shared. The committee's function is 
protective of the hospital. It enables 1l1e hospital ap-
propnately to be adVised that its posture and activities 
are in accord with legal requirements. It is to be re-
membered that the hospital is an entity and that it, 
too, has legal rights and legal obligations. The com-
mittee's focus is on it, and not on the pregnant \vomun. 
To sa.y also that physicians will be guided in the1r 
hospital committee decisions by their predilections on 
extramarital sex unduly narrows the issue to pregnancy 
outside marriage. This case involves more than extra-
marital sex and its product. In addition, the suggestion 
is necessarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious 
physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose profes-
sional activity is concerned with the physical and mental 
"·elfare, the woes, the emotions and the concern of h:is 
feminine patients. He, more than anyone else, is 
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knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and is aware 
of human frailty, so-called "error," and needs. And 
the good physician-despite the presence of rascals in 
the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that 
most physicians are "good"-will have a sympathy and 
an understanding for the pregnant woman patient that 
probably is not exceeded by any of those who partici-
pate in other areas of professional counseling. 
Saying all this, however, does not settle the issue 
of the constitutional propriety of the presence of the 
hospital abortion committee in the Georgia statutory 
system. Viewing the statutes as a whole, we see no f( 
pertinence in the system for the advance a) ); oval b 
the a ortwn commi tee. Under § 26-12 2 (c) a hos-
pital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion and 
not to have an abortion committee. Furthermore, a 
physician or any other employee is free to refrain, for 
moral or religious reasons, from participating in the 
abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are 
in the statute in order to afford some protection to 
the individual and to the denominational hospital in 
the observance of religiously dictated precepts, and in 
business decisions. From this point of view, § 26-
1202 (e) affords adequate protection to the hospital and 
little additional protection is proyided bv the abortion 
committee prescribed by § 26-1202 (b)(5). 
W c conclude that the interposition of the hospital 
abortion committee IS unnecessary and is undul re-
stnc IV 1e patien s ng s an neec s t at, at this 
point, have already 5'"een medically delmeated and sub-
stantiated by her personal physicia.n. To ask more· 
serves neither the hOspital nor the State. 
The third aspect of the attack focuses on the "time 
and availability of adequate medical facilities and per-
sonnel." It is said that the system imposes substantial 
and irrational roadblocks and "is patently unsuited'" 
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to prompt, determination and "makes a mockery of 
Georgia's attempt to justify its statute." 
Time, of course, is critical in the abortion process. 
'Risks during the first trimester of pregnancy arc ad-
mittedly lo,ver than during later months. 
The appellants purport to show by a local study 11 
of Grady Memorial Hospital (serving indigent residents 
in Fulton and DcKa.Ib Counties) that the "mechanjcs 
of the system itself forced ... discontinua.tion of the 
abortive process" because the medium time for the 
workup \Yas 15 days. The same study shows, however, 
that 27 o/o of the candidates for abortion \Yere already 
13 or more weeks pregnant at the time of application, 
that is, they were at the end of or beyond the first 
trimester when they made their request. It is too much 
to say, as the appellants do, that these persons "were 
victims of the system over \Yhich they had no control." 
If hi her risk was incurred because of abortions in the 
second rather tha11 1 rs r 1 1 t 1a t 
risk was due to delay in application, and 110t to the 
alleged cumbersomeness of any system. We note. in 
passing, that appellant Doe had no delay problem her-
self; the decision in her case was made well withjn the 
first trimester. 
lt should be manifest that our rejection of the ac-
credited hospital requirement and, more Important, of 
the hospital abortion com1i-iittee's advance approval 
eliirunates the major grounds of the attack hasecl on 
the system's delay and the lack of faci lt tiCs. There 
remams, however, the required confirmation by t\\·o 
Georgia licensed physicia.ns in the recommenclatio1~ of 
the pregnant \\·oman's O\Yn consultant. \Vc conclude 
that this, too, must fall. 
11 L. Baker nne! l\I. Frermnn , Abortion Surveill;<nrr nt Grad~" 
l\1rmorial Hospit[ll , Crntrr for Di~r:tRr Control (U. 8. Drpartmrnt 
of HE\\·, PH,;:i) , .Tunr and .lui)' 1071. 
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The statute's emphasis, as has been repetitively noted, 
is on the attending physician's "best clinical judgment 
that an abortion is necessary." That should be suffi-
cicllt. The reasons for the presence of the confirmation 
step in the statute are perhaps apparent, but they arc 
insufficient to "·ithstand conc:titutional challenge. We J 
arc cited to no other voluntary medical or surgical pro-
cedure-not even childbirth-for which Georgia requires 
confirmation by t\YO other physicians. If a physician 
is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the State 
as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgmcn t. 
If he fa.ils in this, professional censure or deprivation 
of his license are available remedies. Required acqui-
escence by co-practitioners has no rational connection 
with the patient's needs and unduly infringes on the 
r)Eysician's rio-ht to ractice. The attendant physician 
w1 know when a consultatiOn is advisable-the doubt-
ful situation, the need for assurance when the medical 
decision is a delicate one, ancl the like. Physicians have 
followed this routine for decades and know its useful-
ness and benefit. It is still true today that "Reliance 
must be placed upon the assurance given by his licell"e, 
issued by an authority competent to judge in that re-
spect, that he [the physician l possesses the requisite 
qualifications." Dent Y. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 
122-123 (1889). That is the measure. Sec United 
States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S., at 71. 
D. The Georgia residence requirement is said to be 
violative of th · ht to travel stressed in Shapiro Y. 
wm pson, 3~4 U. S. 618, 629 (1969), anc ot 1cr cases. 
We see no restriction in the statute on the travel right. 
One is no less free, because of the statute, to come to 
or to depart from the State of Georgia. And it can 
be said that the residence requirement is not without 
"torne relab ohslup to the avmla61hty of )Ost- )roccdure 
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Nevertheless. " ·e cannot a]2j)J ove the constitutionality 
::. 
of the residence requirement. It is not based on a 
po~ of preserving state-supported facilities for t1 eorgia 
residents, for the bar apphes as we ll to pnvatc hospitals 
and to privately retained physicians. There is no in-
timation, either. that Georgia facilities are utilized to 
capacity in caring for Georgia residents. Just as the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Const. , Art. IV, § 2, 
protects persons who enter other States to ply their 
trade, TVard "· Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 \Vall.) 418, 430 
(1870); Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 248- 256 
(1898), so must it protect persons who enter Georgia 
seeking the medical services available there. A con-
trary holding would mean that a State may limit to 
its own residents the general medical care available 
within its borders. This >ve cannot approve. 
E. The last argument on this phase of the case is 
the usual one, namely, that the Georgia system is vio-
lative of equal protection because it discriminates against 
the poor. The appellants do not urge that abortion 
should be performed by others than licensed physicians, 
so we have no argument that because the wealthy can 
better afford physicians. the poor should have non-
physicians made available to them. The appellants 
acknowledge that the procedures are "non-discriminatory 
in ... express terms," but they suggest that they have 
produced invidious discriminations. The District Court 
rejected this approach out of hand. 319 F. Supp., at 
1056. It rests primarily on the accreditation and~ 
proval and confirmation requirements, discussea above, 
and on the assertiOn that j o5 ot t tl¢ 159 counties in 
Geor ia have no accredited hospital. Appellants' Juris-
Ictlona tatemen ppen IX We have set aside 
the accreditation approval and confirmation require-
ments, however, and, with that, the discrimination ar-
gument necessarily collapses in all significant aspects. 
70-40-0PINION 
DOE v. BOLTON 21 
IV 
The appellants complaill, finally, of the District 
Court's denial of injunctive relief. A like claim was 
made in Roe v. Wade, ante, at-. We declined deci-
sion there insofar as injunctive relief was concerned, 
and we decline it here. We assume that Georgia's 
prosecutorial authorities will give full recognition to the 
judgment of this Court. 
In summary, we hold that the JCAH accredited hos-
pital provision and the requirements as to approval by 
tE e hos )ital abortion committee, as to confirmab on by 
two additional physiCians, an as to residence in Georgia 
are all unconstitutjppgL SpeCifically, the following por-
tions of ~ 26- 1202 (b) are stricken : 
(1) Subsections (1), (2), and (5). 
(2) That portion of Subsection (3) following the 
words, "Such physician's judgment is reduced to writing." ........ , . J 
(3) That portion of Subsection ( 4) following the / ~\ 
words, "Such abortion is performed in a hospital~ ~ 
./~by the State Board of Health." 
(U The judgment of the District Court is therefore modi-
fied and, as so modified, is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST 
took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
case. 
APPENDIX 
Crimiual Code of Georgia 
(The italicizcd portions arc tho~e hcld unronstitutionrrl by the· 
District Court) 
CHAPTEH 26-12. ABORTION. 
26-1201. Criminal Abortion. Except as otherwise' 
provided in section 26-1202, a person commits criminal 
abortion when he administers any m.edicine, drug or 
other substance '"hatever to any woman or when he uses 
any instrument or other means '"hatever upon any woman / 
with intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion. 
26-1202. Exception. (a) Section 26-1201 shall not ~ 
apply to an • abortion p0rfonned b a 1hysicia11 dul 
licensed to practice mec wmc an I) 
1ap or . or , 0 " 
'lts amended, based upon ius best chmcal JUdgment that /t' 
an abortion is necessary because: 
(1) A continuatwn o} 'bw J>reunancy would endanger 
the life of the pregnant 1uoman or would seriously and 
permanently injure her health; or 
(2) The fetus would very likely be born with a grave, 
permanent, and i1Temediable mental or physical defect; 
or 
(3) The pregna11cy r('S1llted from forcible or statutory 
rape. 
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed 
under this section unless C'ach of the following conditions 
is met; 
(1) The pregnant woman requesting the abortion cer-
tifies in writing under oath and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing to the physician who proposes to per- '='"- our 
form. the abortion that she is a bonn, fide legal resident 
of the State of Georgin,. 
22 
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(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman ~~ AV ,-
is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no .......- v 
information which should lead him to believe otherwise. 
(3) Such physician's .judgment is reduced to writing 
and concurred in bv at least two other physicians dulx 
licensed to r ctice medicine and sur er 
w 10 certi y in writing that based upon their separate ~err 
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman, 
the abortion is, in their judgment, necessary because of 
one or more of the Teasons enumerated above. 
( 4) Such abortion is performed in a hospital licensed 
by the State Board of Ilealth~nd accredited by the Join 9 0 U I 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 
( 5) The performance of the abortion h as been ap-
proved in advance by a commi t e of the medical staff 
of the hos ital in which t 1e operation is to e 1er orme . 
his committee must be one established and maintaine 
in accordance with the standards promulgated by the-
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and 
its approval must be by a majority vote of a membership 0 v-r 
of not less than three members of the hospital's staff; 
the physician proposing to perform the operation may 
not be counted as a member of the committee for this 
purpose. 
(6) If the proposed abortion is considered necessary 
because the woman has been raped, the woman makes a 
written statement under oath, and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing, of i he date, time and place of the rape 
and the name of the rapist, if known. There must be 
attached to this statement a certified copy of any report 
of the mpe made by any law enforcenwnt officer or 
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the 
judicial circuit where the rape occurred or allegedly oc-
curred that, according to his best information, there is: 
probable cause to believe that the rape did occur. 
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(7) Such \rritten opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences are maintained in the permanent files of 
such hospital and are available at all reasonable times 
to the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which 
the hospital is located. 
(8) A copy of such written opinions, statements. cer-
tificates, and concurrences is filed with the Director of 
the State Department of Public Health 'vithin ten (10) 
clays after such operation is performed. 
(9) All \\Titten opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences filed and maintained pursuant to paragraphs 
(7) and (8) of this subsection shall be confidential rec-
ords and shall not be made available for public inspection 
at any time. 
(c) Any solicitor general of the judicial circuit in 
which an abortion is to be performed under this section, 
or any person who would be a relative of the child witMn 
the second degree of consanguinity, may petition the su-
perior court of the county in which the abortion is to be 
performed for a declaratory judgment whether the per-
formance of such abortion would violate any constitu-
tional or other legal nghts of the fetus. Such solicitor 
general may also petit:ion such court for the purpose of 
taking issue with complia·nce with the requirements of 
this section. The physician who proposes to perform the 
abortion and the pregnant woman shall be respondents. 
The petition shall be heard expeditiously and if the court 
adjudges that such abortion would violate the consti-
tutional or other legal rights of the fetus, the court shall 
so declare and shall restrain the physician from perform-
ing the abortion. 
(d) If an abortion is performed in compliance with 
this section, the death of the fetus shall not give rise to 
any claim for "Tongful death. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to 
admit any patient under tho provisions hereof for the 
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purpose of performing an abortion, nor shall any hospital 
be required to appoint a committee such as contemplated 
under subsection (b) ( 5). A physician, or any other 
person who is a member of or associated with the staff 
of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an 
abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing 
an objection to such abortion on moral or religious 
grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical 
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the· 
refusal of any such person to participate therein shall 
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account 
of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory 
action against such person. 
26-1203. Punishment. A person convicted of crim-
inal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than 10 years. 
To: Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Just i ce White 
Mr. Justice Mar shall 
Mr. Justlce Blackmun 
1st DRAFT Mr . Justice Powell / 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED §.'f6\'f~e Chie:r Jusuce 
Xos. 70-18 AND 70-40 Circulated: JAN 1 8 1971 
Recirculated: 
Jane Roe et al. , Appellants, On Appeal from the United -~--_._ __ 
States District Court for 
70- 18 v. the Northern D.istrict of 
Henry Wade. Texas. 
Mary Doc et al, Appellants, 
70- 40 On Appeal from the United v. States District Court for 
Arthur K. Bolton , as Attor-
ney General of the State 
of Georgia. et al. 
the ~orthern District of 
Georgia. 
[February - , Hl73] 
MR. C'RIEF Jus'rJCE B11HGEn. concurring. 
I agree that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, the abortion statutes of Georgia and Texas 
impermissibly limit the performance of abortions neces-
sary to protect the health of the pregnant ·women, using 
the term health in its broadest medical context. See 
l'uitch v. United Stales, 402 U. S. 62, 71- 72 (1971). I 
am somewhat troubled that the Court has taken notice 
of various scientific and medical data in reaching its 
conclusion; however, I do not believe that the Court 
has exceeded the scope of judicial notice accepted in 
other contexts. 
In oral argument. counsel for the State of Texas in-
formed the Court that early abortive procedures \VCre 
routinely permitted in certain exceptional cases, such 
as nonconsensual pregnancies resulting from rape and 
incest. In the face of a rigid and narrow statute, such 
as that of Texas, no one in these circumstances should 
be placed in a posture of dependence on a prosecu-
torial policy or prosecutorial discretion. Of course, 
70- li\ & 70- 40-COl\CUH (B) 
2 
States must have broad power, within the limits indicated 
in the opinions. to regulate the subject of abortions, but 
where the consequences of state intervention are so se-
vere, uncertainty must be avoided as much as possible. 
For my part. I " ·ould be inclined to allow a State to re-
quire the certification of two physicians to support an 
abortion, but the Court holds otherwise. I do not be-
lieve that such a procedure is unduly burdensome, as are 
the complex steps of the Georgia statute, which require 
as many as six doctors and the use of a hospital certified 
by the JCAH . 
.._CPY~ ___ .Q.LJ~'1~""-~_ru_c_e_~J-----=I~d~o_l:.:_lO:::_t:..:,read the Court's holding today as having the 
S\reeping attributed to it by the dissenting Jus-
tires; the dissenting views discount the reality that the 
vast majority of physicians observe the standards of their 
profession, and act ouly on the basis of carefully de-
liberated medical judgments relating to life and health. 
Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Con-
stitution requires abortion on demand. 
1._.1.(/' ~~ 
To: The Chief Justice 
2nd DRAFT 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell ~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: Blackmun, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'PA:rrFS-ted:__.L/1-fi/LO<..-,!j=.:J,f-'-/7-=-::<-
Recirculated: _______ _ 
No. 70-40 
Mary Doe et al., Appellants, 
On Appeal from the 
v. 
Arthur K. Bolton, as Attor-
ney General of the State 
of Georgia, et al. 
United States District 
Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia. 
[November -, 19721 
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN. 
In this appeal the criminal abortion statutes recently 
enacted in Georgia are challenged on constitutional 
grounds. The statutes are §§ 26-1201 through 26-1203 
of the State's Criminal Code, formulated by Georgia 
Laws, 1968 Session, 1249, 1277- 1280. In Roe v. Wade, 
ante -, we today have struck down, as constitutionally 
defective, the Texas criminal abortion statutes that are 
representative of provisions long in effect in a majority of 
our States. The Georgia legislation, however, is different 
and merits separate consideration. 
I 
The statutes in question are reproduced as Appendix A, 
post - .1 As the appellants acknowledge, 2 the 1968 
statutes are patterned upon the American Law Institute's 
:M:oaer" Penal Code, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 
19~ as Appendix B, post -. The ALI 
proposal has served as the model for recent legislation 
in approximately one-fourth of our Statcs.3 The uew 
1 Tho portions italicir.ed in Appendix A arc those held unconstitu-
tional by tho District Court. 
"Appellant;;' Brief 25 n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
a See Roe v. lVade, ante- n. 37. 
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Georgia provisions replaced statutory law that had been 
in effect for more than 90 years. Georgia Laws 1876, 
No. 130, § 2, at 113.< The predecessor statute paralleled 
the Texas legislation considered in Roe v. Wade, ante, 
and made all abortions criminal except those necessary 
"to preserve the life" of the pregnant woman. The new 
statutes have not been tested on constitutional grounds 
in the Georgia courts. 
Section 26-1201, with a referenced exception, makes 
abortion a crime, and § 26-1203 provides that a person 
convicted of that crime shaH be punished by imprison-
ment for not Jess than one nor more than 10 years. Sec-
''The nrtin• proYi~ion~ of thr lRif\ ~t[ilntr wrrr: 
"Rrrtion 1. Be it ennctPd. etc .. Thflt from nne! nftrr thr pn~~ngc 
of thi~ Art. tlw wilful killing of nn unborn rhild, ~o far drvcloprd ns 
to ho onlinnril~· rnllrrl 'quirk,' h~· fln~· injurY to thr mothrr of surh 
rhild. whieh would hr mnrdN if it ro~nltrd in tlw drntl1 of ~nrh 
mothor. ~hnll br guilt~· of n l'rlmn·. find pnni~hnhl0. h~· clrflth or 
impri~omnrnt for lifo. n~ t hr jmy tr.,·ing the rn~r mn.1· rrrommond. 
"Ror. 11. Be it further enorterl, Thnt. r1·rr~· prr~on 11·ho ~h.11l 
ndmini~tPr to an~· " ·nmnn prrg-nnnt with [\ rhild. mw modirinr. drng. 
or ~uhstflnro \\'hntrvor, or ~ hnll u~r or omplo~· .111~· in~trnmrnt or 
othor moan~. 11·ith intont thoroh1· to do~tro~· ~urh rhild. 1mlo~~ thr 
sfl me ~hall lwn~ hcc•n nrrr~~a r~· to prc~crvr thr life of ~nch mothrr. 
or ~hflll hnYr hrrn [tch· i~Pd b~· two J>hY~iC"inn~ to br rwcC'~~flr~· for surh 
pmposr. shall. in rfl~r thP drflth of ~urh rhild or mothrr hr thcrcb~r 
prodnrPcl , ho dPrl:-trwl guilt~· of :m fl,:~;tult IYith intrnt to murder. 
"Srr. III. Be it furth er enorterl. Thnt fln~· pC'r~on who ~hall wil-
ful!~· nclmini~tC'f to nn~· prrgnnnt wmnnn nn~· mcdirinr, dmg or slrb-
strtnc·p, or a n.1·t bing whntr1·C'r , or "hnll rmploY [t m · in~t mnwnt or 
mrnns whatr,·rr, with intrnt thrn•hy to pror11rr thr mi,:cnrringr or 
abortion of 1111\' ~neh woman . mllr"~ tlw ~nnw ~hnll htlYr brrn nrrrs-
sn r.'· to pre . ;rn·r 1hr lifr of >'llrh 1romnn. or ~hnll hf11·r lwrn nc!Yioed 
h~· two ph~·~irifln~ 1o hr nrcr~":u~· for th:tt p11rpo~r. ~h:tll. upon ron-
, ·ir1 ion, lw ptmi"hrd a:< JH'l'..;erilwd in ~rrtion 4;)10 of thr Rr,·i ~ccl 
Codr of Georgia." 
It ~houlcl be notre! th:1t thr ~rrond ,:rrtion, in rontra"t to thr fir~t. 
mnkrs no sprcific rcfrrrnrr to quiekrning. The ~cc tion \Yas soon 
rons1 rurd. ho\\·r,·rr. to po""<'"" t hi~ linr of drmnrr[ttion. Taylor v . 
State, 105 Ga. R4fi, ;)3 S. E . 190 (1899). 
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tion 26-1202 (a) states the exception and removes from 
§ 1201's definition of criminal abortion, anci thUS makes 
JlOr;crimimll, m1 Ubortlon ''p~rformed by a physician duly 
licensed" in Georgia -,\:hen. "based urmr1 hisbe~t-clinical 
judgment ... an abortion is~~ary because 
" ( 1) A continuation of the pregnancy would en-
danger ~e life of the pregnant woman or would 
seriously and permanently injure her health, or 
"(2) ~fetus would very likely be born with 
a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or 
physical defect, or 
"(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or 
statutory rape." 5 
Section 26-1202 also requires, by numbered subdivisions 
of its subsection (b). that. for an abortion to be author-
i?:ed or performed as a noncriminal procedure, additional 
c~must be fulfilled. These are (1) and (2) resi-
dence of the woman in Georgia; (3) reduction to writing 
of the performing physician's medical judgment that an 
abortion is ,iustified for one or more of the reasons speci-
fied by ~ 26-1202 (a), with written concurrence in that 
judgment by at least two other Georgia-licenseQ..Qbysi-
cians, based upon their separate personal medical exam-
ina IOns of the woman; ( 4) performance of the abortion 
in a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and 
also a~editeCT by the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals; (5) advancr approval by an abortion 
committee of not less than threcmcm ers o the hos-,...____ 
pi tal's staff; (6) certifications in a rape situation; and 
(7), (8), a,nd (9) maintenance and confidentiality of 
records. There is a provision (subsection (c)) for ,iudi-
"Tn rontrnst with thr ALT moclPI. tlw (;porgia ~tatutr makrs no 
sprrifir rdrrrncr to prrgn:mry rr~ulting from incr"t. vVc were n~­
Rurrd h~· thr Rt:tfr nt rr:ngnmrnt th:1t this w:w hrrausr thr Rtntutc':; 
rcfrrrmr to "rapr" wa~ intrndrd to inrludr inrr~t. Tr. of Rcnrg. 32. 
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cial determination of the legality of a proposed abortion 
on petition of the judicial circuit law officer or of a close 
relative, as therein defined. of the unborn child. and for 
expeditious hearing of that petition. There is also a 
provision (subsection (e)) giving a hospital the right not 
to admit an abortion patient and giving any physician 
and auy hospital employee or staff member the right, on 
moral or religious grounds, not to participate in the 
procedure. 
II 
On April 16, 1970, Mary Doe/ 23 other individuals 
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as 
nurses registered in the State, five as clergymen, and two 
as social workers), and two nonprofit Georgia corpora-
tions that advocate abortion reform, instituted this fed-
eral action in the Northern District of Georgia against 
the State's attorney general. the district attorney of 
Fulton County, and the chief of police of the city of 
Atlanta. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 
that the Georgia abortion statutes were unconstitutional 
in their entirety. They also sought injunctive relief 
restraining the defendants and their successors from en-
forcing the statutes. 
Mary Doe alleged : 
"(1) She was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, mar-
ried, and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living 
children. The two older ones had been placed in a 
foster home because of Doe's poverty and inability 
to care for them. The youngest, born July 19, 1969, 
had been placed for adoption. Her husband had 
recently abandoned her and she was forced to live 
with her indigent parents and their eight children. 
She and her husband, however, had become recon-
6 Appellants by their complaint, App<:>nclix 7, allege thal the name 
is a pseudonym. 
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cilcd. He was a construction worker employed only 
sporadically. She had been a mental patient at the 
State Hospital. She had been advised that an abor-
tion could be performed on her with less danger to 
her health than if she gave birth to the child she 
was carrying. She would be unable to care for or 
support the new child. 
"(2) On March 25, 1970, she applied to the Abor-
tion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital, At-
lanta, for a therapeutic abortion under § 26-1202. 
Her application was denied 16 days later, on April 
10. when she 'vas eight weeks pregnant. on the 
ground that her situation was not one described in 
§ 26-1202 (a). 7 
"(3) Because her application was denied, she was 
forced either to relinquish 'her right to decide when 
and how many children she will bear' or to seek an 
abortion that was illegal under the Georgia statutes. 
This invaded her rights of privacy and liberty in 
matters related to family, marriage, and sex, and 
deprived her of the right to choose whether to 
bear children. This was a violation of rights guar-
anteed her by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The statutes also denied· 
her equal protection and procedural due process and, 
because they were unconstitutionally vague, de-
terred hospitals and doctors from performing abor-
tions. She sued 'on her own behalf and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated.' " 
The other plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia statutes 
"chilled and deterred" them from practicing their respec-
tive professions and deprived them of rights guaranteed 
7 In answer::; to intcrrogatoric::; Doc stnted that her application for 
an abortion was approyed al Georgia Bapl i~l Ho::;pibl on May 5, 
1970, but that she was not approved as a rharit~· patient there and 
had no money to pay for an abortion. Appendix 04. 
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by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Those plaintiffs also purported to sue on their own behalf 
and on behalf of others similarly situated. 
A three-judge district court was convened. An offer 
of proof as to Doc's identity was made, but tho court 
deemed it unnecessary to receive that proof. The case 
was then tried on the pleadings and interrogatories. 
The District Court, per curiam, 319 F. Supp. 1048 
(ND Ga. 1970), held that all the plaintiffs had standing 
but that only Doc presented a justiciable controversy. 
On tho merits, the court concluded that the limitation 
in the Georgia statute of the "number of reasons for 
which an abortion ma.y be sought," id., at 1056, improp-
erly restricted Doe's rights of privacy articulated in 
Griswold Y. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and of 
"personal liberty," both of which it thought "broad 
enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy," 
id. , at 1055. As a consequence, the court held invalid 
those portions of ~~ 26- 1202 (a) and (b )(3) limiting 
legal abortions to tho throe situations specified; ~ 26-
1202 (b)( 6) relating to certifications in a rape situation; 
and ~ 26-1202 (c) authorizing a court test. Declaratory 
relief was granted accordingly. The court, hmvevcr, held 
that Georgia's interest in protection of health, and the 
existence of a "potential of independent human exist-
ence" (emphasis in original), id., at 1055, justified state 
regulation of "the manner of performance as ''"ell as 
the quality of the final decision to abort," id., at 1056. 
and it refused to strike clown the other provisions of 
the statutes. It denied tho request for an injunction , 
'id., at 1057. 
Claiming that they 'vere entitled to an injunction and 
to broader relief. the plaintiffs took a direct appeal pur-
suant to 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253. We postponed dPcision on 
jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941 
(1971). The defendants also purported to appeaL pm-
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suant to § 1253, but their appeal was dismissed for \vant 
of jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 936 (1971). We are advised 
by the defendant-appellees, Brief 42, that an alternative 
appeal on their part is pending in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The extent, 
therefore, to '"hich the Di:strict Court decision was ad-
verse to the defendants, that is, the extent to which 
portions of the Georgia statutes were held to be uncon-
stitutionaL technically is not now before us. ' Swarb v. 
Lennox, 405 U. S. 191, 201 (1072). 
III 
Our decision in Roe v. Wade, ante -, establishes 
( 1) that, despite her pseudonym. we may acceptas true, 
for this case. Mary Doe's existence and her pregnant 
state on April 16, 1970; (2) that the constitutional issue 
is substantial; (3) that the interim termination of Doe's 
and all other Georgia pregnancies in existence in 1970 
has not rendered the case moot; and ( 4) that Doe pre-
sents a justiciable controversy and has standing to main-
tain the action. 
Inasmuch as Doe and her class arc recognized, the 
question whether the other appellants-physicians, 
nurses, clergymen. social workers, and corporations-
present a justiciable controversy and have standing is 
perhaps a matter of no great consequence. We conclude, 
however, that the physician-appellants, who arc Georgia-
licensed doctors consulted by pregnant women, also pre-
sent a justiciable controversy ::mel do have standing de-
spite the fact that the record docs not disclose that any 
one of them has been prosecuted. or threatened with 
prosecution, for violation of the State's abortion statutes. 
The physician is the one against whom these criminal 
statutes directly operate in the event he procures an 
8 What \YC' drrid<' i oclaY nl)\'iou~l~· ha~ impliration~ for i hr i~~ur~ 
mi~rcl in the clcfrndants' appra l pending in the Fifth Cirruit. 
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abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions 
and conditions. The physicimH~j_)pe~lts, thcreforer I 
assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. 
They should not be--reQUireato await a.nCT undergo a 
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. 
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 839-840 (CA6 
1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 
(Kans. 1972). 
ln holding that the physicians, while theoretically pos-
sessed of standing, did not present a justiciable contro-
versy, the District Court seems to have relied primarily 
on Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). There a 
sharply divided Court dismissed an appeal from a state 
court on the ground that it presented no real contro-
versy justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue. 
But the challenged Connecticut statute, deemed to pro-
hibit the giving of medical advice on the use of contra-
ceptives, had been enacted in 1879, and, apparently with 
a single exception, no one had ever been prosecuted under 
it. Georgia's statute, in contrast, is recent and not 
moribund. Furthermore, it is the successor to another 
Georgia abortion statute under which. we are told,9 
physicians were prosecuted. The present case, therefore, 
is closer to Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), 
"·here the Court recognized the right of a school teacher, 
though not yet charged criminally, to challenge her 
State's anti-evolution statute. See also Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 481. 
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker,. 
and corporation-appellants are another step removed and 
as to them, the Georgia statutes operate less directly. 
Not being licensed physicians, the nurses and the others 
are in no position to render medical advice. They would 
be reached by the abortion statutes only in their capacity 
n Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. 
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as accessories or as counselor-conspirators. We conclude 
that we need not ~ss upon the status of these-aacii-
tional appclla;t"s in thi~uit, for the issues -;re -;uffi-
ciently and adequately presented by Doe and- the physi-
cian.:appeuant8,ana nothing is gained or lost by_ tho· 
presenccm:-- absence of the n~ses,th;-clergymen, the 
social workers, and the corporations. See Roe v. Wade,. 
ante, at-. 
IV 
The appellants attack on several grounds those por-
tions of the Georgia abortion statutes that remain after 
the District Court decision: undue restriction of a right 
to personal and marital privacy; vagueness; deprivation 
of substantive and procedural due process; improper re-
striction to Georgia residents; and denial of equal 
protection. 
A. Our decision today in Roe v. Wade, ante, sets forth 
our conclusim1tnat apregnant woman does not have an 
absolute constitutiOnal right to an abortion on her de-
Iliana. "Wfiat is said tfiere is applicable here and need 
11ot'6e repeated. 
B. The appellants go on to argue, however, that the· 
present Georgia statutes must be viewed historically, 
that is, from the fact that prior to the 1968 Act an 
abortion in Georgia was not criminal if performed tcr 
"preserve the life" of the mother. It is suggested that 
the present statute, as well, has this emphasis on the 
mother's rights, not on those of the fetus. Appellants 
contend that it is thus clear that Georgia has given little, 
and certainly not first, consideration to the unborn child .. 
Yet it is the unborn child's rights that Georgia asserts 
in justification of the statute. Appellants assert that 
this justification cannot be advanced at this late date. 
Appellants then argue that the statutes do not ade-
quately protect the woman's right. This is so because-
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it would be physically and emotionally damaging to Doe 
to bring a child into her poor "fatherless" ' 0 family, and 
because advances in medicine and medical techniques 
have made it safer for a woman to have a medically 
induced abortion than for her to bear a child. Thus, "a 
statute which requires a woman to carry an Ul1\mnted 
pregnancy to term infringes not only on a fundamental 
right of privacy but on the right to life itself." Brief 27. 
The appellants recognize that a century ago medical 
knowledge was not so advanced as it is today, that the 
techniques of antisepsis were not known, and that any 
abortion procedure was dangerous for the woman. To 
restrict the legality of the abortion to the situation where 
it was deemed necessary, in medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the woman's life was only a natural con-
clusion in the exercise of the legislative judgment of that 
time. A State is not to b0 rc>proached, however, for a 
past judgmental determination made in the light of then-
existing medical knowledge. It is perhaps unfair to 
argue, as the appellants do, that because the early focus 
was on the preservation of the woman's life, the State's 
present professed interest in the protection of embryonic 
and fetal life is to be downgraded. That argument de-
nics the State the right to readjust its views and em-
phases in the light of the advanced knowledge and 
techniques of the day. 
C. Appellants argue that ~ 26-1202 (a) of the Georgia 
statute, as it has been left by the District Court's deci-
sion, is unconstitutionally vague. This argument centers 
in the proposition that, with the District Court's having 
stricken the statutorily specified reasons, it still remains 
a crime for a physician to perform an abortion except 
when, as ~ 26- 1202 (a) reads, it is "based upon his best 
clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary." The 
10 Appell::mts ' Brirf 2.5. 
70-40-0PINION 
DOE v. BOLTON 11 
appellants contend that the word "necessary" does not 
warn the physician of what conduct is proscribed; that 
the statute is wholly without objective standards and is 
subject to diverse interpretation; and that doctors will 
choose to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary. 
The net result of the District Court's decision is that 
the abortion determination. so far as the physician is 
concerned, is made in the exercise of his professional, that 
is. his "best clinical'' judgment in the light of all the 
attendant circumstances. He is not no>v restricted to 
the three situations originally specified. Instead, he may 
range farther afield wherever his medical judgment, prop-
erly a.nd professionally exercised, so dictates and directs 
him. 
The vagueness argument is set at rest by the decision 
in United States v. l!uitch, 402 U. S. 62. 71-72 (1971), 
where the issue was raised with respect to a District of 
Columbia statute making abortions criminal "unless the 
same were done as necessary for the preservation of the 
mother's life or health and under the direction of a 
com})etent licensed practitioner of medicine." That stat-
ute has been construed to bear upon psychological as 
well as physiCaT We1T-6emg. 'l'li1s bemg so. the Cc;-;:;-rt 
conCiuaed that the term "health" presented no problem 
of vagueness. "Indeed, whether a particular operation 
is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is 
a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon 
to make routinely whenever surgery is considered." 402 
U. S., at 72. This conclusion is equally applicable here.l 
\Vhether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abor-
tion is necessary," is a professional judgment that the 
Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely. 
We a<Tree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at 
1058,' that the medical judgment may be exercised in the 
light of all factors-physiCal, emotional, psychological, 
familiaL and the wo~s age-relevant to the well-
....--- -- I~
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being of the patient. All these factors may relate to 
health. T~Ys the attending physician the room he 
1-;eea-s to make his best medical judgment. And it is 
room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, 
of the pregnant woman. 
D. The appellants next argue that the District Court 
should have declared unconstitutional three procedural 
demands of the Georgia statute: (1) that the abortion 
be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals: 11 (2) that the 
procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion 
committee; and (3) that the performing physician's 
judgment be confirmed by the independent examinations 
of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The 
appellants attack these provisions not only on the ground 
that they unduly restrict the woman's right of privacy, 
but also on procedural due process and equal protection 
grounds. The physician-appellants a1so argue that, by 
subjecting a doctor's individual medical judgment to 
committee approval and to confirming consultations, the 
statute impermissibly restricts the physician's right to 
practice his profession and deprives him of due process. 
1. JCAH Accreditation. The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals is an organization without 
governmental sponsorship or overtones. No question 
whatever is raised concerning the integrity of the organi-
zation or the high purpose of the accreditation process.u 
11 We were advi~rcl at r ra rgument , Tr . of Rearg. 10. ihnt onl~r 54 
of Georgia's 159 rounti rs haY<' n .TCAH nccreditccl ho8pital. 
1 2 Since it~ founding . .TCAH hn~ punmccl thr "rlu~i\·r goal" of 
clrfining the "optimal 'rtting" for "quality of ~rrvi c r in ho~pitnls ." 
J CAH. Accreditation l\bnual for Ho~pitn ls, Forcwnrd (Dec. 1970) . 
The Manual's Introduction state" the org:mization's purpo~r to r~t n b­
lish standards and rondu rt accredit;~tion programs that will afford 
qua lity medical cnre "to gi\·r pntirnts thr optim:1l benefit s that med-
ical science has to offer." This nmbitious nne! admirnbl e go:1l i ~ 
illustrated by .TCAII'M drri~im1 in 19Gfi " to rai~r nne! Htrrnglhcn the-
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That process. however, has to do with hospital standards 
generally and has no present particularized concern "'ith 
abortion as a medical or surgical procedure.'3 In Geor-
gia there is no restriction of the performance of non-
abortion surgery in a hospital not yet accredited by the 
JCAH so long as other requirements imposed by the 
State, such as licensing of the hospital and of the operat-
ing surgeon, are met. See Georgia Code ~~ 88- 1901 (a) 
and 88- 1905 (1971) and 84- 907 (Supp. 1971). Further-
more, accreditation by the Commission is not granted 
until a hospital has been in operation at least one year. 
The Model Penal Code, § 230.3, Appendix B hereto, con-
tains no requirement for JCAH accreditation. And the 
Uniform Abortion~ (Final Draft, August 1971) ,1 4 aP: 
proved 0y the American Bar Association in February 
1972,c ontain;-;1-;- JCAH accred1tea hospital specifica-
tion.1G &meco~sllave held that a JCAH accredita-
standards from their present ]eye[ of minimum e,·sentinl to the level 
of optimum achien1ble . . . . " Some of these "optimum achievable"' 
standards required are: disrlosnre of ho~pitnl ownership and con-
trol; a dietetic service and writt en dietetic policies; a written dis-
aster plnn for mass emergencies : a nuclear medica 1 services program ; 
facilities for hematolog~·, rlwmistry, mi rrobiology, clinical microscopy, 
nnd sero-immunolog~·; a profe,~ionn llibrnry nne! document delivery 
service; a radiology program : n social sen·ires plnn n dmini~ t errd by 
a qualified social worker ; and a special cnre unit. 
1 ~ "The Joint Commis~ion neither ndvocntes nor oppose~ any 
particular position with re~pect to electi\·e abortions." Letter dated 
July 9, 1971 , from John L. Brewer , M. D., Commissioner, JCAH, 
to the Rockefeller Foundut ion. Brief for amici, American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologi~ t s, et al. , p . A-3. 
14 Sre Roe v. Wade. anti'-, n . 40. 
1 " Some state statutes do not have the J CAH accreditation re-
quirement. Alaska Stat . § 11.15.060 (1970) ; Hawaii Rev . Sta t . 
§ 453.16 (Supp. 1971) ; N . Y. Penal Code § 125.05.:{ (J\'fcKinnry 
Supp. 1972-19n) . Wa shington haH the requirement but couples it 
with the 11lt ernati\'e of " <L medical facility approved ... by the stat e 
board of health." Wash . Rev. Code § 9.02.070 (Snpp. 1972). Flor-
ida's new statut e ha~ a similar proYi~ioJl. Law of Apr. 13, 1072, c. 
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tion requirement is an overbroad infringement of funda-
mcn tal rights because it docs not relate to the particular 
medical problems and dangers of the abortion operation. 
Poe v. Menghini, 330 F. Supp. 986, 993-994 (Kan. 
1972); People v. Barksdale, 06 Cal. Rptr. 265. 273-274 
(Cal. App. 1971). 
We hold that the JCAH accreditation requirement does 
not " ·ithstand constitutional scrut' n in the prescn on-
t~xt :.... n is a rcquiwncnt that simply is not "based on 
differences that arc rcaso11ahly related to the purposes of 
the Act in which it is found." Morey v. Dmul, 354 U. S. 
457, 465 (1957). 
This is not to say. as the appellants themselves con-
cede, Brief 40. that Georgia may not or should not adopt 
standards for licensi1)g all f;;i'lities where abortionslna:y 
be performcdWrong as those standards arc legitimately 
related to the objective the :State seeks to accompli~:<h. 
The appellants conte11d that such a relationship would 
be lacking even in a lcf'ser requirement that an abortion 
be performed in a licensed hospital, as opposed to a fa-
cility, such as a clinic. that may be required by the :State 
to possess all the staffing and services necessary to per-
form. an abortion safely (including those adequate to 
handle serious complications or other emergency. or ar-
rangements with a nearby hospital to provide such serv-
ices). Appellants and various amici have presented us 
with a mass of data purporting to demonstrate that some 
institutions other than hospitals are entirely adeq~atc to 
perform abortions if they possess these qualifications. 
72-19(), § 1 (2). Othrr' ront:1in thr ~prrifirntion. Ark. Sl :1t. Ann . 
§§ 41-803 to 41-310 (Supp. 1971); C:1l. Hr:dth nne! Safrt~· Coclr 
§§ 2.1\l!i0-2 ,19.15 .• 1 (\Yr~t Supp. 1972); Colo. Rrv. Stat~. Am1. §§ 40-
2-50 to 40-2-ii::l (Prrm. Cum. Sttpp. 19()7); T<an. Stat. Ann.§ 21- 8047 
(Supp. 1971); 1\Ttl. Ann. Cock Art. 4:~. §§ 1::l7-189 (Hrpl. 19i1). 
Cf. Del. Codr Ann. §~ 1790-179:~ (Snpp. 1970) ~preil\ing '':1 nn-
1ionnll~· rrrog;nizrd mrdical or ho~pitnl .1rrrcditntion nnthorit~·," 
§1790(a). 
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The State, on the other hand, has not presented persua-
sive data to show that only hospitals meet its acknowl-
edged interest in insuring the quality of the operation 
and the full protection of the patient. 'Ve feel compelled 
to agree \\·ith appellants that the State must show more 
than it has shown to prove that only the full resources 
of a licensed hospital. rather than those of some other 
appropriately licensed institntion, satisfy these health in-
tm·ests. 'Ye hold that the hospital requirement of the 
Georgia law is a so invalic . n so 10 c wg we natillali'y 
express no opinion on the medical judgment involved in 
any particular case. that is. whether the patient's situa-
tion is such that an abortion should be performed in a 
hospital rather than in some other facility. 
2. Cmmnittee Approval. The second aspect of the 
appellants' procedural attack relates to the hospital abor-
tion comn1ittee and to the pregnant "·oman's asserted 
lark of access to that committee. Relying primarily on 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 307 U. S. 254 (1070), concerning the 
termination of welfare benefits. and Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1071), concerning the posting 
of an alcoholic's name, Doe first argues that she >vas denied 
clue process because she could not make a presentation 
to the committee. It is not clear from the record, how-
ever, whether Doe's own consulting physician was or was 
not a member of the committee or did or did not pre-
sent her case, or, indeed. whether she herself was or was 
not there. vVe see nothing in the Georgia statute that 
explicitly denies access to the committee by or on behalf 
of the woman. If the access point alone were involved, 
we would not be persuaded to strike down the committee 
provision on the unsupported assumption that access is 
not provided. 
Appellants attack the discretion the statute leaves to 
the committee. The most concrete argument they ad-
vance is their suggestion that it is still a badge of infamy 
"in many minds" to bear an illegitimate child, and that 
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the Georgia system enables the committee members' per-
sonal views as to extramarital sex relations, and pullish-
ment therefor, to govern their decisions. This approach 
obviously is one founded on suspicion and one that dis-
doses a lack of confidence in the integrity of physicians. 
To say that physicians will be guided in their hospital 
committee decisions by their predilections on extramarital 
sex unduly narrows the issue to pregnancy outside mar-
riage. (Doc's own situation did not involve extramarital 
sex and its product.) The appellants' suggestion is neces-
sarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious physician, 
particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity 
is concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the 
woes, the emotions, and the concern of his female patients. 
He, perhaps more than anyone else, is knovdeclgeable in 
this area of patient care, and he is aware of human frailty, 
so-called "error," and needs. The good physician-de-
spite the presence of rascals in the medical profession, as 
in all others, we trust that most physicians are "good" 
-will have a sympathy and an understanding for the 
pregnant patient that probably is not exceeded by those 
who participate in other areas of professional counseling. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the abortion committee 
has a function of its own. It is a committee of the hos-
pital and it is composed of members of the institution's 
medical staff. The membership usually is a changing 
one. In this way its work burden is shared and is more 
readily accepted. The committee's function is protective. 
It enables the hospital appropriately to be advised that 
its posture and activities arc in accord with legal re-
quirements. It is to be remembered that the hospital 
is an entity and that it, too, has legal rights and legal 
obligations. 
Saying all this, however, does not settle the issue of 
the constitutional propriety of the committee require-
ment. Viewing the Georgia statute as a whole, we see 
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no constitutionally justifiable pertinence in the structure 
~~ --
for the advance approval by the abortio~tee. 
W1tlrngarcl tothe protccii(;D ~tru1tiallife, the med-
ical judgment is already completed prior to the committee· 
stage, and review by a committee once removed from di-
agnosis is basically redundant. We are not cited to any 
other surgical procedure made subject to committee ap-
proval as a matter of state criminal law. The woman's 
right to receive medical care in accordance with her li-
censed physician's best judgment and the physician's right 
to administer it are substantially limited by this stat-
utorily imposed overview. And the hospital itself is 
otherwise fully protected. Under ~ 26-1202 (e) the hos-
pital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. It is 
even free not to have an abortion committee. Further, 
a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, 
for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the 
abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are in 
the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the 
individual and to the denominational hospital. Section 
26-1202 (e) affords adequate protection to the hospital 
and little more is provided by the committee prescribed 
by ~ 26-1202 (b)(5). 
We conclude that the interposition of the hospital abor-
tion committee is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights 
and needs that, at this point, have already been medically 
delineated and substantiated by her personal physician. 
To ask more serves neither the hospital nor the State. 
3. 'l'wo-Doctor Concurrence. The third aspects of the 
appellants' attack centers on the "time and availability 
of adequate medical facilities and personnel." It is said 
that the system imposes substantial and irrational road-
blocks and "is patently unsuited" to prompt determina-
tion of the abortion decision. Time, of course, is critical 
iu abortion. Risks during the first trimester of preg-
nancy arc admittedly lmver than during later mo11ths. 
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The appellants purport to show by a local study ,r. of 
Grady Memorial Hospital (servi11g indig0nt residents in 
Fulton and DeKalb Counties) that the "mechanics of 
the system itself forced ... discontinuation of th0 abor-
tion process" because the median time for the vvorkup 
was 15 days. The same study shmYs, however, that 27% 
of the candidates for abortion were already 13 or more 
w0eks pregnant at the tim8 of application, that is, they 
wer0 at the end of or beyond the first trimester when they 
made their applications. It is too much to say, as ap-
pellants do. that these particular p0rsons "were victims 
of [a] system over which they [had] no control." If 
higher risk was incurred because of abortions in the 
second rather than the first trimester, much of that risk 
was due to delay in application, and not to the alleged 
cumbersomeness of the system. \Ve note, in passing. 
that appellant Doc had no delay problem herself; the 
decision in her case 'ms made well within the first 
trimester. 
It should b0 manifest that our rejection of the ac-
credited hospital requirement and, more important, of 
the abortion committee's advance approval eliminates the 
major grounds of the attack based on the system's delay 
and the lack of facilities. There remains, however, the 
required confirmation by t"·o Georgia-licensed physicians 
in addition to the recommendation of the pregnant "'O-
Jnan's own consultant (making under the statute, a total 
of six physicians involved. including the three on the 
hospital's abortion committee). We conclude that this 
provision. too, must fall. 
The statute's emphasis, as has been repetitively noted, 
is on the attending physician's "best clinical judgment 
that an abortion is necessary." That should be sufficient. 
IG L. lhkrr & \f. Frrrmun, Abortion Smn•ill:IJH'r n1 Grad~· 1\fe-
morinl Hospit:1l Crntcr for Di~ca~c Control (.Tunc :1nd .Tuly 1971) 
(U. S. Dept. of HEW, PIIS). 
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The reasons for the presence of the confirmation step in 
the statute are perhaps appare11 t, but they arc insufficient 
to ·withstand constitutional challenge. Again, no other 
voluntary medical or surgical procedure for which Georgia 
requires confirmation by two other physicians has been 
cited to us. If a physician is licensed by the State, he 
is recognized by the Rtatc as capable of exercising accept-
able clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional 
censure or deprivation of his license are available reme-
dies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection \Vith a patient's needs and unduly 
infringes on the physician's right to practice. The at-
tending physician will know when a consultation is ad-
visable-the doubtful ::<ituation, the need for assurance 
when the medical decision is a delicate one, aml the like. 
Physicians have followed this routine historically and 
knO\Y its usefulness and benefit for all concerned. It is 
still true today that "r r] eliancc must be placed upon the 
assurance given by his license. issued by an authority 
competent to judge in that respect, that he [the physi-
cianl possesses the requisite qualifications." Dent v. 
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,122-123 (1889). Sec United 
States Y. Vuitch, 402 U. S., at 71. 
E. The appellants attack the residency requirement 
of the Georgia law, ~ ~ 26-1202 (b) ( 1) and (b) (2), as 
violative of the right to travel stressed in Shapiro Y. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. 629-631 (1969), and other 
cases. \Vc~­
travel right as such. One is no less free, because of the 
statute, t~ ;;;;~r to depart from the State of Georgia. 
Further, it cannot be said that the residency require-
ment might not have a possible relationship to the 
availability of post-procedure medical care for the aborted 
patient. 
1'\evertheless, we do not uphold the constitutionality of 
the residence reqUTremenl It ls not based on any policy -----
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of preserving state-supported facilities for Georgia resi-
dents, for the bar also applies to private hospitals and 
to privately retained physicians. There is no intimation, 
either. that Georgia facilities are utilized to capacity in 
caring for Georgia residents. Just as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, Const. Art. IV, ~ 2, protects persons 
\\·ho enter other States to ply their trade, Ward v. Mary-
land, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Blake v. 
McClung, 172 U.S. 239. 248-256 (1898). so must it pro-
tect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical serv-
ices that are available there. See Toomer "· Witsell, 334 
U. S. 385, 396-397 (1948). A contrary holding would 
mean that a State could limit to its own residents the 
general medical care available within its borders. This 
we could not approve. 
F. The last argument on this phase of the case is one 
that often ~ly, that the Georgia system is vlo- ·? 
lativc of equal protection because it discriminates against 
the poor. The appellants do not ' urge that abortio"i1s 
s'i10liiCfiJe performed by persons other than licensed physi-
cians, so we have no argument that because the wealthy 
can better afford physicians, the poor should have non-
physicians made available to them. The appellants ac-
knowlcged that the procedures arc "nondiscriminatory 
in ... express terms" but they suggest that they have pro-
duced invidious discriminations. The District Court re-
jected this approach out of hand. 319 F. Supp. , at 1056. 
:Ihe nnan y on the accreditation and approval and 
confirmation requirements, discussed above, and on the 
assertion that most of Georgia's counties have no ac-
credited hospital. We have set aside the accreditation, 1· 
approval, and confirmation requirements, however, and 
with that, the discrimination argument collapses in all 
significant aspects. 
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The appellants complain, finally, of the District Court's 
denial of injunctive relief. A like claim was made in 
Roe v. Wade, ante. We declined decision there insofar 
as injunctive relief was concerned, and 've decline it here. 
"\Ve assume that Georgia's prosecutorial authorities will 
give full recognition to the judgment of this Court. 
In summary, '"'e hold that the JCAH accredited hos-
pital provision and the requirements as to approval by 
the hospital abortion committee, as to confirmation by 
two independent physicians, and as to residence in 
Georgia are all violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Specifically, the following portions of § 26-1202 (b), re-
maining after the District Court's judgment, are invalid: 
(1) Subsections (1) and (2). 
(2) That portion of Subsection (3) following the words 
"such physician's judgment is reduced to writing." 
(3) Subsections ( 4) and (5). 
The judgment of the District Court is modified ac-
cordingly and, as so modified, is affirmed. Costs are 
allowed to the appellants. 
APPEXDI:X A 
Crimil!al Code of Georgia 
(The it:tlirizrd port ion~ are t ho~r held nnron~t it utiona.l b~· the 
Di~l riel Comt ) 
CHAPTEH 26- 12. ABORTION. 
26- 120L Criminal Abortion. Except as otherwise 
provided in section 26-1202, a person commits criminal 
abortion when he administers any medicine, drug or 
other substance whatever to any woman or when he uses 
any instrument or other means whatever upon any woman 
with intent to produc(• a miscarriage or abortion. 
26-1202, Exceptio11. (a) Section 26-1201 shall not 
apply to an abortion performed by a physician duly 
licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to 
Chapter 84---9 or 84-12 of the Code of Georgia of 1933, 
as amended, based upon his best clinical judgment that 
an abortion is necessary because: 
(1) A con ti11uation of the pregnancy would endanger 
the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and 
permanently injure her health; or 
( 2) The fetus woulrl very likely be born with a grave, 
permanent, and irremediable mental or physical deject; 
or 
(8) The pregna11cy resulted from forcible or statutory 
rape. 
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed 
under this section unless each of the following conditions 
'is met; 
(1) The pregnant '"oman requesting the abortion cer-
tifies in writing under oath and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing to the physician who proposes to per-
form the abortion that she is a bona fide legal resident 
of the State of Georgia. 
22 
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(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman 
is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no 
i11formation which sholild lead him to believe otherwise. 
(3) Such phys.ician'b judgment is reduced to writing 
and concurred in by at least two other physicians duly 
licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to 
Chapter 84-0 of the Code of Georgia of 1033, as amended, 
·who certify in \\Titing that based upon their separate 
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman, 
the abortion is, in their .i udgment, necessary because of 
one or· more of the 1·rasons emunerated above. 
( 4) Such abortion is performed in a hospital licensed 
by the State Board of Health and accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 
( 5) The performance of the abortion has been ap-
proved in advance by a committee of the medical staff 
of the hospital in ·which the operation is to be performed. 
This committee must be one established and maintained 
in accordance with the standards promulgated by the 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and 
its approval must be by a majority vote of a membership 
of not less than three members of the hospital's staff: 
the physician proposing to perform the operation may 
not be counted as a member of the committee for this 
purpose. 
(6) If the woposed abortion is considered necessary 
because the woman has been raped, the woman makes a 
written statement under oath, and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing, of the date, time aud 7Jlace of the rape 
and the name of the rapist, if known. There must be 
attached to this statement a certified copy of any report 
of the rape made by any law enf01·cement officer or 
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the 
judicial circuit where the r-ape occurred or allegedly oc-
curred that, accordinu to his best information, there is 
probable cause to believe that the rape did occur. 
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(7) Such written opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences are maintained in the permanent files of 
such hospital and are available at all reasonable times 
to the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which 
the hospital is located. 
(8) A copy of such written opinions, statements, cer-
tificates, and concurrences is filed with the Director of 
the State Department of Public Health within ten (10) 
days after such operation is performed. 
(D) All written opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences filed and maintained pursuant to paragraphs 
(7) and (8) of this subsection shall be confidential rec-
ords and shall not be made available for public inspection 
at any time. 
(c) Any solicitor ueneral of the judicial circuit in 
which an abortion is to be performed under this section,. 
or any person who would be a relative of the child within 
the second degree of consanguinity, may petition the su-
perior court of the county in which the abortion is to be 
performed for a declaratory judgment whether the per-
formance of such abortion would violate any constitu-
tional or other legal r~ghts of the fetus. Such solicitor 
general may also petition such court for the purpose of 
taking issue with compliance with the requirements of 
this section. The physician who proposes to perform the 
abortion and the pregnant woman shall be respondents .. 
The petition shall be heard expeditiously and if the court 
adjudges that such abortion would violate the consti-
tutional or other legal rights of the fetus, the court shall 
so declare and shall restrain the physician from perform-
ing the abortion. 
(d) If an abortion is performed in compliance with 
this section, the death of the fetus shall not give rise to 
any claim for \vrongful death. 
(e) Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to 
admit any patient u11der the provisions hereof for the 
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purpose of performing an abortion, nor shall any hospital 
be required to appoint a committee such as contemplated 
under subsection (b) ( 5). A physician, or any other 
person who is a member of or associated with the staff 
of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an 
abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing 
an objection to such abortion on moral or religious 
grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical 
procedures which v;·ill result in the abortion, and the 
refusal of any such person to participate therein shall 
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account 
of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory 
action against such person. 
26-1203. Punishment. A person convicted of crim-
inal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than 10 years. 
APPE~DIX B 
American Law Institute 
MODEL PEXAL CODE 
Section 230.3. Abortion. 
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely 
and unjustifiably terminates the pregnancy of another 
otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of the 
third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued be-
yond the twenty-sixth IYeek, a felony of the second degree. 
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justi-
fied in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the 11regnancy would 
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the 
mother or that the child would be born with grave 
physical or mental defect. or that the ]Wegnancy resulted 
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All 
illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be 
deemed felonious for purpo:<:es of this subsection. Justi-
fiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed 
hospital except in case of emergency when hospital fa-
cilities are unavailable. ·r Additional exceptions from the 
requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated here 
to take account of situations in sparsely settled areas 
where hospitals are not generally accessible.] 
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption from Non-
Compliance. No abortion shall be performed unless two 
physicians, one of "·hom may be the person performing 
the abortion, shall have certified in writing the circum.-
stances which they believe to justify the abortion. Such 
certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to the 
hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of 
abortion following felonious intercourse. to the prosecut-
ing attorney or the police. Failure to comply with any 
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of the requirements of this Rubsection gives rise to a 
presumptio11 that the abortion was unjustified. 
( 4) Self-A borlion. A " ·oman whose pregnancy has 
continued beyond the t"·cnty-sixth "·eek commits a felony 
of the third degree if she purposely terminates her own 
pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth, or if she uses 
instrumcn ts, drugs or violence upo11 hen:elf for that pur-
pose. Except as justified under Subsection (2), a person 
who incl urrs or knowingly aids a woman to use instru-
ments, drugs or violence upo11 herself for the purpose of 
terminating her pregnancy othenvise than by a live birth 
commits a felony of the third degree whether or not the 
pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth 'veek. 
(5) Pretended A bort?'on. A ]Wrf"on commits a felony 
of the third degree if, representing that it is his purpose 
to perform an abortion, he docs an act adapted to cause 
abortion in a pregnant woman although the woman is 
in fart not pregnant, or the actor docs not believe she is. 
A person charged with unjustified abortion under Sub-
section (1) or an attC'mpt to commit that offense may be 
convicted thereof upon proof of conduct prohibited by 
this Subsection. 
(6) Distribution of Abortifacients. A person who 
sells, offers to sell, possesses with intent to sell, advertises. 
or displays for sale anything specially designed to termi-
nate a pregnancy, or held out by the actor as useful for 
that purpose, commits a misdemeanor, unless: 
(a) the sale, offer or display is to a physician or drug-
gist or to an intermediary in a chain of distribution to 
physicians or druggists; or 
(b) the sale is macle upon prescription or order of a 
physician; or 
(c) the possession is with intent to sell as authorized 
in paragraphs (a) and (b); or 
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(d) the advertising is addressed to persons named in 
paragraph (a) and confined to trade or professional chan-
nels not likely to reach the general public. 
(7) Section Inapplicable to Prevention of Pregnancy. 
Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the 
prescription, administration or distribution of drugs or 
other substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by pre-
venting implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other 
method that operates before, at or immediately after 
fertilization. 
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